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I. CONTEXT1
In the context of cross-provider network service provision-
ing, the “Provider Alliance” concept has recently arisen as a
necessary collaboration framework among providers willing to
offer cross-provider connection-oriented services [1]. A possi-
ble provider alliance management solution for inter-AS Multi-
Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) relies on the deﬁnition of
a “service level” above a Path Computation Element (PCE)-
based multi-domain control-plane as presented in [2].
In the provider alliance context, transit and edge service
elements are offered and selected dynamically by providers
to compose end-to-end tunnelling services, hence satisﬁng
customer requests. Among the several parameters of a service
element (or service level speciﬁcation), the bandwidth can
be considered as the main one. In the provider alliance
solution proposed in [2], between the service element request
(selection) and its provisioning (activation) there is a phase
of instantiation that ends well if the resources announced with
the service alement are actually available in the moment of the
request. Operationally speaking, the service plane conﬁgura-
tion of service elements’parameters shall be coordinated with
a static resource reservation at the network plane.
A multi-domain distributed scheme for a cooperative opti-
mization of inter-domain link reservation levels is presented
in [3] (and in the sequel). The authors deﬁne the basis of
an iterative distributed optimization process, run either in the
control plane or in the management plane of the network,
in which domains, cooperating in a coalition, calculate the
optimal pattern of inter-domain trafﬁc ﬂow. The objective of
the optimization process can be seen as a maximization of the
sum of incomes of individual domains under the assumption
that the income of a domain depends linearly on the amount
of inter-domain trafﬁc the domain injects into the network.
As the objective function might prefer that a domain should
rather transit than inject trafﬁc, such an implicit distribution
rule could lead to an unfair distribution of the total income.
In fact, as a domain has no guarantee to gain any additional
proﬁt (in reality, it may even loose) there is no incentive to
enter the coalition (or provider alliance).
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In order to close that gap, we completed the distributed
cooperative optimization model with a mechanism of provably
fair distribution of the coalition’s income adopted from the
theory of cooperative games [4]. It represents a further step
toward the deﬁnition of novel business models for the future
Internet.
II. RATIONALES
We are thus interested in an interconnection scenario in
which multiple domains interact to optimize link capacity
reservation levels, thus to improve their inter-domain routing,
escaping a solution guided by unilateral and selﬁsh choices
toward a more effective global solution. An important outcome
of the distributed optimization described in [3] is a conﬁgura-
tion set of link reservation levels, which can be aggregated at
the inter-domain (provider) scope.
When applied in the provider alliance context, we believe
that the management agreement between providers shall rely
on side payments since the multi-provider optimization can
arise disparities. In fact, in order to reserve bandwidth for
external connections for which no direct earning is obtained, a
provider may need a form of economical incentive. Under this
standpoint, it is indeed possible that, by reserving bandwidth
for external connections, a provider grants earnings to its
“peers” bigger than the earnings related to its own services.
It is thus needed to deﬁne a fair scheme for multi-provider
income distribution that rewards a provider in a way that is
not solely based on the generated trafﬁc (Content provider be-
havior, see [6]) or absorbed trafﬁc (Eyeball provider behavior,
see [6]) but also accordingly to its alliance transit contribution,
i.e., that takes into account how much a provider supports
the services of the other providers allocating its network’s
resources.
III. A SHAPLEY VALUE PERSPECTIVE
The Shapley Value concept is a game theoretic solution
for value imputation problems that offers interesting proper-
ties [5]. For this reason, it has been applied to very diverse
ﬁelds [7]. The Shapley Value considers the strategic weight
(importance) of each player in the alliance to share the alliance
value, and satisﬁes desirable properties of individual fairness,
efﬁciency, symmetry, additivity and null player modeling.
The Shapley value is calculated as follows: (i) consider
all the possible permutations of the players (ii) for each per-mutation and each player, calculate the marginal contribution
that the player grants if he joins the coalition formed by the
predecessor players (iii) for each player, calculate the average
of its marginal contributions on all the permutations.
The Shapley value can be used to assign the payoff (income)
of a player (provider) as function of his marginal contribution
to the coalition. Given that the marginal contribution that a
player brings to a coalition (i.e., the alliance income related to
its connection services) varies as a function of the players that
already form the coalition, it is essential considering the order
in which the player enters the coalition (or would enter if a
coalition evaluates the opportunity of joining the new player).
In our context, each provider is modeled as a player. The
marginal contributions to each possible subcoalition depends
on the optimized reservation levels. The computation of this
data is cumbersome, but not computationally complex. The
subsequent computation of the Shapley Values is treatable
for small networks, but increases fastly with the number of
providers.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In our experiments we compared imputation of the income
of a multi-domain network generated by the proposed Shapley
value based distribution with that generated by the original
distribution (cf. [3]), where the whole income related to a
demand is attributed to a domain that injects this demand into
the network, and no domain receives income for transiting
nor terminating the trafﬁc. Note that value of the income is
deﬁned as equal to (depending linearly on) the total volume
of demands that the coalition serves.
For example, in Fig. 1, we restrict our focus to an arbitrary
destination node m3 in a 7-domain networks; a number beside
a link denotes the bandwidth reservation level. Considering
these reservations, one can then easily compute the amount
of trafﬁc to node m3 that every node either injects into the
network, terminates or transits, hence the Shapley values can
also be computed. Table I shows imputations generated by
the two distributions (Shapley based and the original one)
in context of the considered ﬂow. Columns i, t and tr of
the table show income components related to trafﬁc that a
domain injects and terminates, respectively. The last column P
denotes total imputation that a domain receives.
Observing Table I one can conclude that the original dis-
tribution is unfair – as there are signiﬁcant unpaid volumes
of trafﬁc terminated by domain m3 and transited through
domains m2, m4 and m5. The second part of Table I shows
that the proposed Shapley value distribution schemes offers
signiﬁcantly fairer results, as domains are awarded for every
type of their contribution in the total income (the ‘x’s mean
that the Shapley value attributed to transit domain cannot
be easily divided into components related to injecting and
transiting of trafﬁc).
V. FURTHER WORK
As a further work we aim to reﬁne the optimization decom-
position method so as to allow a pro-active integration of the
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Fig. 1. Flow to domain m3
original distribution Shapley distribution
i t tr
P
i t tr
P
m0 1225 0 0 1225 408 0 0 408
m1 1619 0 0 1619 809 0 0 809
m2 1902 0 0 1902 x 0 x 1188
m3 0 0 0 0 0 6010 0 6010
m4 1091 0 0 1091 x 0 x 602
m5 5948 0 0 5948 x 0 x 3408
m6 1045 0 0 1045 323 0 0 323
TABLE I
FLOW m3 RELATED INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Shapley values. The idea is to control the amount of trafﬁc
volume a provider is allowed to inject within the alliance.
In fact, it might be desirable to allow rewarding a provider’s
transit contribution directly with intra-alliance trafﬁc injection
ability by bounding the inter-provider throughput.
Such an integration of the Shapley value into the distributed
optimization framework may reveal to be unfeasible for a
number of technical reasons. One direction seems to compute
good approximations of the Shapley Value. Using the existing
mathematical formulation and exploiting the properties of the
provider alliance game, other broader solution sets from the
theory of cooperative games (e.g., the core) could allow to
restrict to a few solutions close enough to the Shapley value.
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